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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
GUARANTY NATIONAL
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Respondent,
vs.

CASE NO.

16207

BARBARA J. MORRIS,
Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF CASE
Plaintiff insurer, who paid $2,787.61 in No-Fault
benefits to defendant insured, filed this lawsuit after the
insured's personal attorney refused to endorse a check in
said amount for the settlement with State Farm Insurance
Company, the tortfeasors' liability carrier, without first
receiving a one-third contingent fee therein.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court granted plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment (R. 12-13), specifically holding the plaintiff had ".

0

0

no obligation to the defendant

0

• •

for

attornevs' fees or costs with respect to the subrogated interests asserted by (plaintiff).

o

0

for the no-fault payment
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and benefits paid to . . . (defendant)."

(R. 84).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks a ruling affirming the Judgment
rendered below.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A written stipulation of facts was filed with the
lower court for the purpose of determining the summary judgment motions filed by both parties.

(R. 52-81)

These stipu-

lated facts indicate that the plaintiff, Guaranty National
Insurance Company, as insurer, and the defendant, Barbara J.
Morris, as the insured, entered into an insurance contract
which provided, among other things, for No-Fault benefits
pursuant to Section 31-41-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as
amended.

(R. 52)

This policy was in force on December 16,

1975, when defendant was involved in an automobile collision
with a Rick Chapman, insured by State Farm.

(R.

52- 53)

Following this accident, plaintiff insurer paid
defendant $2,787.61 in No-Fault insurance benefits.

(R.

52)

On June 24, 1976, plaintiff gave written notice to
State Farm of its claim for reimbursement of the No-Fault
benefits paid defendant.

(R. 53, 74)

On :-Jovember 9, 1976,

plaintiff was advised by State Farm that defendant had obtained
the services of an attorney and that the reimbursement request
could not be honored until the liability claim had been
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,
may contain errors.
- 0-

resolved.

(R. 53, 75)

On February 22, 1977,

State Farm

advised plaintiff of the name of defendant's attorney and
that negotiations were still pending.

(R. 53, 76)

On

December 22, 1977, defendant executed a release and settled
with State Farm for $14,000, which was well within the limits
of the tortfeasors' insurance policy with State Farm.

(R. 53,

77)
No lawsuit was ever filed by defendant's attorney
and the settlement of December 22, 1977 with State Farm was
accomplished out of court.

(R. 53)

On January 6, 1978, defendant's attorney first
advised plaintiff of defendant's settlement with State Farm.
Defendant's attorney further advised plaintiff that the NoFault payments, which were being paid out of the $14,000
settlement, were subject to a one-third contingent fee,
totalling $928.27.

(R. 53, 78-79)

Prior to this letter of

January 6, 1978, neither defendant nor her attorney had made
demands or requests for attorneys' fees regarding the No-Fault
interests due plaintiff from State Farm, and no agreement had
been entered into between plaintiff and defendant regarding
attorneys' fees.

(R.S4)

A one-third contingent fee arrange-

ment had been entered into between defendant and her attorney.
(R.

54)

State Farm Insurance Company sent a draft to plaintiff
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for the No-Fault benefits paid to defendant, but the draft
was made payable to both plaintiff and defendant's attorney.
Defendant's attorney refused to endorse the draft unless his
alleged one-third contingent fee therein was put in trust,
awaiting the outcome of this action.
Plaintiff denied responsibility for any attorneys'
fees or costs relative to the No-Fault reimbursement from State
Farm (R. 80-81) and brought this action for a declaration that
it was not responsible for such fees and for a release of any
claim by defendant to those funds.

(R. 1-3)

Defendant answered

and by way of counterclaim, asserted a right to attorneys'
fees and costs of $928.27.

(R. 9-10)

Motions for Summary

Judgment based upon these facts, were filed by both parties
and, after a hearing thereon without a transcript, the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, Judge, entered an Order granting plaintiff's
~otion

ponding

for Summary Judgment and denying defendant's corres~lotion.

ARGmtENT
POINT I.
UTAH'S NO-FAULT INSURANCE ACT
WAS ENACTED TO STABILI:E I~
SURANCE COSTS BY PROVIDI:-.iG
BINDING ARBITRATION BET\I'EEN
I:-.JSURANCE CO~IPANIES ON THE ISSUE
OF REDIBURSDIENT FOR PAID :\0F,'\ULT BENEFITS.
From the stipulated facts, it appears clear that
defendant's attornev did not represent plaintiff.

Defendant's

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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attorney never requested, in advance, the right to represent
plaintiff Guaranty National on its no-fault claim, and no such
permission was ever given to defendant's attorney by plaintiff.
Plaintiff first became aware of the attorney's representation
of their insured by way of letter, dated February 22, 1977,
from State Farm.

It was eight months prior to that time when

plaintiff notified State Farm of its claim for reimbursement
for

~o-Fault

benefits as provided under Utah's No-Fault Insurance

Act.
To allow defendant's attorney to unilaterally appoint
himself as attorney for plaintiff, and to then demand a onethird contingent fee in the No-Fault recovery, is a violation
of the public policy declared by the Utah Legislature in enacting Utah's No-Fault Insurance Act.
The Utah No-Fault statute, by recognizing the rights
of arbitration between insurers, makes it clear that the Legislature wants to stabilize insurance costs by reducing unnecessary
attorneys' fees and costs.
Section 31-41-2, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as
amended, provides:
31-41-2.

Purpose of act.

* * *

The intention of the legislature is
hereby to possibly stabilize, if not
effectuate certain savings in, the
rising costs of automobile accident
insurance and to effectuate a more

- 5Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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efficient, equitable method of
handling the greater bulk of the
personal injur~ cla1ms that arise
out of automob1le accidents, these
being those not involving great
amounts of damages.
(Emphasis
added.)
Section 31-41-11 provides:
31-41-11. Subrogation rights and
arbitration between insurers.
(1) Every insurer authorized to
write the insurance required by this
act shall agree as a condition to
being allowed to continue to write
insurance in the state of Utah:
(a) That where its insured is
or would be held legally liable for
the personal injuries sustained by
any person to whom benefits required
under this act have been paid by another
insurer, including the state insurance
fund, it will reimburse such other
insurer for the avment of such benelts, ut not 1n excess o the amount
or-damages so recoverable, and
(b) That the issue of liability
for such reimbursement and the amount
of same shall be decided by mandatory
bindin arbitration between the insurers.
Emp asis a
If it is intended that insurance costs be stabili:ed,
it is not reasonable to pay attorneys' fees and costs that are
unnecessary.

Defendant's attorney is claiming a fee for

services that plaintiff did not want and did not ask him to
perform.

He is claiming costs that plaintiff did not incur,

did not authori:e and for expenses that served no purpose to
Guaranty

~ational.

If an insurance compan)· is required to pay

· [ )provided
·
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attorneys' fees and costs to plaintiffs for bringing actions.
when there is binding arbitration provided by statute. insurance
costs will increase rather than stabilize or decrease as was
intended by the drafters of Utah's No-Fault Act.
In State Farm Hutual Insurance Co. v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 22 Utah2d 183, 450 P.2d 458 (1969) 1 this
Court upheld the right of one insurance company to recover from
another for property damage and medical costs.

The Court said

that subrogation springs from equity, concluding that one who
has been reimbursed for a specific loss should not be entitled
to a second reimbursement.

In a later case, State Farm Mutual

Insurance Company v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 27 Utah2d 166,
493 P.Zd 1002 (1972), this Court held that, where one company
had given notice to another of its subrogation claim, it was
subrogated to recover medical expenses paid.
The No-Fault statute, by recognizing the rights of
arbitration between insurers, intended to avoid unwanted and
unnecessary attorneys' fees and costs.
Defendant's attorney's refusal to endorse State Farm's
draft to plaintiff is contrary to the policy behind Utah's
No-Fault Insurance Act, and interfered with Guaranty National's
contractual subrogation rights.
As noted above in Section 31-41-11, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended, the issue of liability for No-Fault
reimbursements and the amount thereof is determined by arbitration

- 7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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between the insurers.

By that statute, plaintiff Guaranty

National is prohibited from filing suit for No-Fault benefits,
unlike the usual insurance subrogation cases.

For that

reason, the cases cited by defendant in Point I of her brief
are not applicable to this case involving No-Fault claims.
In Point II of her brief, defendant has argued her
rights to attorneys' fees by analogy from the Workmen's Compensation Laws, which are clearly not analogous.

There is no

arbitration provision in the Workmen's Compensation statute.
Furthermore, Workmen's Compensation statute, Section 35-1-62(2)
Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended, specifically has
provided for attorneys' fees.

These critical differences

preclude any meaningful parallels between the Workmen's Compensation and No-Fault laws.
In addition, defendant's arguments regarding the
unconstitutionality of the arbitration statute for No-Fault
benefits are not properly before this Court and are without
merit.

Section

31-~1-11,

Utah Code Annotated (1953) (Arbi-

tration) applies only to insurance companies.

~o

insurance

company is before this Court raising any objections to that
statute.

Insurance companies universally are in favor of the

statute because it enhances the amount of subrogation recoveries,
reduces the costs of court and attorneys' fees, and avoids
delays in the processing of claims between insurance companies.

- 8-
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r-tos t insurance companies, nationwide, engage in
arbitration of the standard automobile and other subrogation
claims under an Inter-Company Arbitration Compact, which has
been successful for the very reasons cited above.
State Farm is willing and has agreed to repay the
plaintiff the full amount of its No-Fault claim, as evidenced
by the draft issued by State Farm.

The defendant's attorney,

who is not a party to this litigation, is the one blocking this
payment based upon a claim for a one-third contingent fee from
plaintiff which he did not represent.
The claim in Appellant's Brief, Point II, that the
rule against splitting a cause of action renders the arbitration section of the statute unconstitutional, is erroneous.
The rule against splitting a cause of action is based
solely on the desire of the courts to prohibit a multiplicity
of lawsuits.

See Raymer v. Hi-Line Transport, Inc., SO Utah Zd

.l27, 394 P.Zd 383.

Obviously, the above statute does not permit the
filing of a separate suit by the subrogation insurer, but does
provide for a separate arbitration hearing, if that becomes
necessary.

The defendant is not being compelled to arbitrate

her claims under the statute.
Furthermore, there is nothing in the statute that
prohibits the injured party from including all of her special
damages in her lawsuit.

If she does, and a judgment is awarded
- 9-
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for the full amount of her special damages, including her
insurance company's subrogation interest, the amount of that
interest is deducted by the trial judge from the judgment,
for the very reason that she is not entitled to a double
recovery or unjust enrichment.
The insured's (injured party's) constitutional
rights to due process, or any other rights, are not affected
in any way.

She has received her No-Fault benefits, which are

payments made in advance for her injuries.

By the reduction

of the judgment to the extent of her advance payments, she has
not been prejudiced, or her rights affected, in any way.
Should the injured party (insured) and her attorney
elect not to include the amount of the advance payments in her
lawsuit, she is certainly not splitting a cause of action, and
her insurance carrier, by statute, may then arbitrate their
subrogation claim, if necessary.
POINT I I.
DEFE>JDA:--JT ~IORRI S HA.S BREACHED THE
SUBROG.HION CL.\.USE OF HER INSUR.I\:--.ICE
CONTRACT.
Under plaintiff's insurance policy, No-Fault benefits
are provided through endorsement 43 PIP.

As

regards subrogation,

this endorsement provides:
d. Subrogation. In the event of anY
avment under this coveraae, the Com any
lS subrogate
to the rights ot the person

- lll-
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to whom or for whose benefit such payments were made, to the extent of such
pa~ments, and such person must execute
an deliver instruments and papers and
do whatever else is necessary to secure
such rights. Such serson shall do nothing
after loss to preju ice such rights.
e. Reimbursement and Trust Agreement.
In the event of any payment to any
person under this coverage:
1. the Company shall be entitled
to the extent of such payment to the
proceeds of any settlement or judgment that may result from the exercise
of any rights of recovery of such person
against any person or organization
legally responsible for the bodily
injury because of which such payment
is made; and the Company shall have a
lien to the extent of such payment,
notice of which may be given to the
person or organization causing such
bodily injury, his agent, his insurer
or a court having jurisdiction in the
matter;
2. such person shall hold in
trust for the benefit of the Company
all rights of recovery which he shall
have against such other person or
organization because of such bodily
injury;
3. such person shall do whatever
is proper to secure and shall do
nothing after loss to prejudice such
rights;
4. such person shall execute and
deliver to the Company instruments
and papers as may be appropriate to
secure the rights and obligations of
such person and the Company established
by this provision.
Under this insurance contract, defendant agreed to
execute and deliver instruments and papers and to do whatever
- 11-
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else was necessary to secure plaintiff's subrogation rights,
and not to do anything to prejudice its rights.

State Farm

had expressed a willingness to honor the plaintiff's No-Fault
reimbursement request after the resolution of the liability
claim.
Following the settlement of the liability claim, a
$2,787.61 draft was, in fact, mailed by State Farm directly
to plaintiff to reimburse it for the PIP payments to defendant.
State Farm recognized the right of plaintiff to be reimbursed
in this amount.

Defendant's attorney rendered no service in

obtaining this sum.

The draft was mailed to plaintiff and

the only requirement as far as State Farm was concerned was
that defendant's attorney endorse it.
Utah recognizes both common law and written policy
provisions allowing subrogation to the insurance company.
In Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 107 Utah 114,
152 P.Zd 98 (1944), the court held an insurer was subrogated
to the rights of the insured against the person whose wrongful acts or omissions had caused the injury and that the suit
could be brought in the name of the insured, rather than the
name of the insurance company.

State Farm

Company v. Farmers Insurance Exchange,
Farm

~utual

~utual

supra.

Insurance

(1969), State

Insurance Company v. Farmers Insurance Exchange,

supra. (1972), and Transamerica Insurance Company v. Barnes,
29 Utah 2d 101, 505 P.2d 783 (1972), support Guaranty
~ationa1's

right to the subrogation recovery.
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Section 31-41-6 that describes the benefits one is
entitled to receive under the No-Fault Act does not include
a benefit for attorneys' fees and expenses in pursuing a
claim against a third person.

Defendant Morris, by and through

her attorney, is trying to compel plaintiff to pay a benefit
outside of the scope of PIP coverage, and in so doing, has
breached the subrogation clauses of her insurance contract.
POINT II I.
THE DOCTRINE OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT IS
NOT APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE, BUT EVEN
ASSUMING PLAINTIFF IS OBLIGATED TO PAY
THE DEFENDANT ATTORNEYS' FEES, UNDER
THE DOCTRINE OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT,
ONLY THE REASONABLE VALUE OF SERVICES
CAN BE RECOVERED.
The attorney for the defendant maintains that he
should be compensated a one-third contingent fee of the plaintiff's

~o-Fault

recovery inasmuch as he had a one-third contin-

gent fee agreement with the defendant as to her recovery.
one-third contingent fee to be deducted from the

A

~o-Fault

reimbursement cannot be supported in this case, even if the
doctrine of unjust enrichment were found to be applicable.
In this case, no court costs were incurred, inasmuch as a lawsuit was never initiated.

Defendant's attorneys'

fees for services were obviously incurred for the sole purpose
of recovering general and other damages not compensated by ~oFault pavments from plaintiff.
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Defendant's attorney, when he first accepted her
case, either knew or should have known about the

~o-Fault

statute, and the subrogation requirements, and he should not
now be permitted to ignore the statute and to recover a fee
from the plaintiff who did not retain him.
In 7 C.J.S., Attorney-- Client, Section 175, p. 1041:
No one can legally claim compensation
for incidental benefits and advantages
to one, flowing to him on account of
services rendered to another by whom
the Attorney may have been employed
or . . . for services voluntarily
rendered.
See also, Seal v. Lefevre,

22 Utah2d 125, 449 P.2d 651 (1969),

where this Court held that the individual cattlemen were not
bound to pay a fee to an attorney employed by the Cattlemen's
Association.
In Baugh v. Darley, 112 Utah 1, 184 P.Zd 335 (1947),
a plaintiff was seeking to recover the value of services in
procuring a purchaser for land.

In discussing the doctrine of

unjust enrichment, Justice Wolfe stated, at 337.
Unjust enrichment of a person occurs
when he has and retains money or
benefits which in justice and equity
belong to another.
(Citations
omitted.) The benefit may be on
interest in money, land, chattels,
or choses in action; beneficial
services conferred, satisfaction
of a debt or duty owed by him; or
anything which adds to his security
or advantage.
The remedy where unjust enrichment has occurred was defined at

- 14-
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in an action for unjust enrichment, in those cases where there is a
proper equitable basis for the same,
the measure of damages, by the great
weight of authority is the reasonable
value of the services rendered.
In the present case, an arbitrary one-third contingent fee is
not

the reasonable value of services rendered and evidence

would have to be introduced on the reasonable time and nature
of those services.
The doctrine of unjust enrichment is not applicable
in this case for reasons long recognized by this Court.

In

Baugh, supra., Justice Wolfe stated at 337:
The mere fact that a person benefits
another is not of itself sufficient to
require the other to make restitution
therefor. Restatement of Restitution,
Sec. 1, comment c. Services officiously
or gratuitously furnished are not recoverable. Restatement of Restitution,
Sec. 2. Nor are services performed by
the laint1ff for h1s own advanta e,
an
rom wh1ch the e en ant ene 1ts
incidentalli, recoverable . See Restatement o Restitution, Sec. 40,
comment c; and Sec. 41 (a) (i).

* * *

Generally, unless such services enhance
or benefit the property of the defendant or otherwise confer on him a direct
benefit, they do not form the basis of
a contract imposed by law because there
is not 'unjust enrichment' as that term
is used in law. Where such services
operate to confer a direct benefit upon
the defendant, they may be recoverable.

* * *
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The most that can be contended for
plaintiff's efforts is that they made
known to a willing purchaser the fact
that the defendant's land was available
for purchase at a certain price. This
benefit, if such it was, was at best
only a mere incident to the plaintiff's
efforts to enrich himself. It did not
increase the intrinsic value of the
land. It did not give the defendant
any legal rights which he did not
previously have. It did not increase
his estate, nor &ive him a ~osition
of greater secur1ty. It d1 not
remove any legal liability.

* * *

We do not think that plaintiff conferred a 'benefit' upon the defendant in the sense in which that term
is used in the law of unjust enrichment.
(Emphasis added.)
Similarly, in Fowler v. Taylor, 554 P.Zd 205 (Utah
1976), this Court held that a real estate broker was not en-

titled to a fee under the theory of unjust enrichment.

The

Court cited Baugh, supra., with approval, stating:
The fact that a person benefits another
is not itself sufficient to require the
other to make restitution. Also, not
recoverable are services officiously
or gratuitously furnished; services
performed by the plaintiff, for his own
advantage, and from which defendant
benefits incidentally.
In the present case, the defendant provided services
which were not needed or wanted by the plaintiff.

The plain-

tiff's remedy was through binding arbitration as between insuran:,
companies as set forth in Section
l1953), as amended.

31-~1-11,

Utah Code Annotated

State Farm Insurance Company, the carrier
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for the negligent third party, had acknowledged the plaintiff's
rights to subrogation and only refused to pay until the liability
claim had been resolved.
Under the Baugh and Fowler decisions cited above,
defendant's attorney cannot now claim compensation from plaintiff for services performed for the defendant's own advantage
and from which plaintiff benefited only incidentally, if at all.
CONCLUSION
The lower court correctly held that defendant's
attorney is not entitled to attorneys' fees with regard to
the

~o-Fault

reimbursement from State Farm to plaintiff.

This ruling is consistent with the purpose and
public policy of the Utah Legislature in passing Utah's
\lo-Fault Act; that is, to "stabilize'' and effectuate certain
savings "in the rising costs of automobile accident insurance"
and to "effectuate a more efficient, equitable method of
handling the great bulk of the personal injury claims that
are out of automobile accidents."
The doctrine of unjust enrichment is not applicable
in this case where no court costs were incurred, no lawsuit
was ever filed, and where the defendant's attorney negotiated
settlement for the defendant's own advantage, and did not
enhance or benefit plaintiff's ability to recover the NoFault sums directly or by arbitration from State Farm.

- l 7-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

DATED this t~ day of May,

979.
submitted,

HANSON
D ID H. PPERSON
HANSON, RUSSON, HA~SON & DUNN
702 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 363-7611
Attorneys for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I certify that I hand-delivered two true and correct
copies of the foregoing Respondent's Brjef to Kent M. Kasting,
Attorney for Appella~, 1000 Boston B "lding, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84111, this ~day of May, 1 9
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